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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether aliens who have 
committed serious crimes in this country may be detained 
in custody for prolonged periods when the country of origin 
refuses to allow the individual's return. We conclude that 
such detention is permitted by the relevant statutes, and is 
constitutional if the government provides individualized 
periodic review of the alien's eligibility for release on parole. 
Because petitioner did not receive the necessary rigorous 
review, we will grant a writ of habeas corpus subject to the 
right of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
promptly institute appropriate administrative action. 
 
Petitioner is a native of Vietnam who was paroled 1 into 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Attorney General has the discretion to temporarily "parole" alien 
refugees into the United States. 8 U.S.C. S 1182(d)(5)(A), (B) (1994). The 
term "parole" is nowhere defined. See 5 Charles Gordon et al., 
Immigration Law and Procedure S 62.01[1], at 62-2 (1999). In the context 
of an alien's initial entry, this amounts to permission by the Attorney 
General for ingress into the country but is not a formal "admission." 8 
U.S.C. S 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994). When the Attorney General concludes that 
the purposes of this immigration parole have been served, she may order 
the alien to "return or be returned to . . . custody." Id. When parole is 
revoked, the alien reverts to the status of an applicant for admission, 
 
                                2 
  
the United States as a refugee in 1982. He was arrested in 
1988 for possession of a firearm and in 1989 for attempted 
robbery. He was convicted in state court and received 
concurrent sentences of one year each for the firearm 
offense and an accompanying bail-jumping charge, and two 
to four years for the attempted robbery. 
 
In March 1995, petitioner was subjected to exclusion 
proceedings by the INS for lack of a valid immigrant visa, 
8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1994); conviction of a crime 
involving moral turpitude, id. S 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); and 
conviction of two or more crimes for which the aggregate 
sentences actually imposed were five years or more, id. 
S 1182(a)(2)(B). After a hearing before an immigration judge, 
petitioner was ordered excluded and deported. The order 
became final on July 6, 1995. 
 
After petitioner was paroled by state authorities, he was 
taken into custody by the INS and has been detained since 
that time. The record does not disclose exactly when 
petitioner came into INS custody, but it appears to have 
been around the middle of 1995. The detention was served 
in county jails in Pennsylvania until petitioner was 
transferred to the INS center in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
where he is presently confined. The INS has attempted to 
return petitioner to Vietnam, but that country has refused 
to accept him. 
 
Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in December 1995, 
but his request was denied by the District Court, which 
cited the INS' "diligent effort[s]" to return him to Vietnam. 
No appeal was taken. Petitioner subsequently filed the 
present petition in November 1996, contending that 
because Vietnam will not take him back, he is subject to 
virtually indefinite detention in violation of due process. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
whose admissibility is determined in exclusion or the more recent 
removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. S 1226 (1994); id. S 1229a (Supp. II 1996); 
5 Gordon et al., supra, S 62.01[4], at 62-12. "Parole" in this sense is 
different from the conventional sense of parole from a term of 
incarceration. As will be seen, the term "parole" has a third usage 
describing the release from custody of aggravated felons who are being 
held in administrative detention. 
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Petitioner also contended that he should be eligible for 
release on parole. His submissions to the District Court 
included letters from individuals attesting to his reformed 
character, and a statement that while incarcerated, he had 
obtained a GED, learned skills, and attended classes on 
behavior modification and theology. The District Court 
denied relief to petitioner without an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Petitioner had also applied to the Attorney General for 
release on parole. An Assistant District Director for 
Detention and Deportation denied the request in a 1996 
letter, stating that petitioner represented a high risk of 
flight and a threat to the safety of the community based on 
his record of convictions and bail jumping. Some months 
later, another Assistant District Director, in an affidavit, 
echoed the previous letter. Since then, petitioner has been 
denied discretionary parole in at least three letters that 
essentially parrot the previous refusals. 
 
On appeal, we appointed counsel for petitioner, who 
previously had been unrepresented. In this Court, 
petitioner contends that confining him on an indefinite and 
possibly permanent basis is a denial of his substantive and 
procedural due process rights. Moreover, he asserts that 
denial of parole without a determination of his present 
dangerousness and risk of flight is arbitrary and capricious, 
particularly in the absence of detailed regulations governing 
review of such applications. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the petition for 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2241. Sandoval v. Reno, 
166 F.3d 225, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1999); see also DeSousa v. 
Reno, ___ F.3d ___, No. 99-1115, 1999 WL 643171, at *5 
(3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1999). We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and review the dismissal of an 
application for habeas corpus de novo. Yang v. Maugans, 
68 F.3d 1540, 1546 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
I. 
 
Petitioner does not contend that the Attorney General 
lacks authority to remove him from the United States, but 
instead, disputes whether she may keep him in custody. 
The first issue before us is whether, after afinal order of 
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exclusion is issued, she has the statutory authority to 
detain aliens who have committed specific crimes. We 
conclude that the Attorney General does have such power 
under both the statute in force at the time of the 
petitioner's initial detention, and the version as amended in 
1996. 
 
At the time petitioner was first detained, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Act required the Attorney General to 
"take into custody any alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony upon release of the alien" from incarceration, 
pending a determination that he was excludable. 8 U.S.C. 
S 1226(e)(1) (1994); see also 8 U.S.C.S 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994) 
(giving the Attorney General the right to return into custody 
a parolee who had been allowed into the country when, in 
her opinion, "the purposes of such parole shall .. . have 
been served"). Under that version of the Act, Congress 
required that an excluded alien be "immediately deported," 
unless the Attorney General concluded that, "in an 
individual case, . . . immediate deportation is not 
practicable or proper." 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(1) (1994). 
 
In cases where the country of origin would refuse or 
unduly delay the alien's return, the Attorney General could 
release the detainee from custody, but only where review 
established that he would not pose a danger to the safety 
of other persons or property. 8 U.S.C. SS 1226(e)(2), (3), 
1253(g) (1994); see also Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 
956, 960-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (under section 1226(e), once 
alien is taken into custody, detention must continue even 
after a final order of exclusion is issued). 
 
Although the version of the Act applicable when 
petitioner was first detained does not expressly grant 
authority to detain excluded aliens, the overall structure of 
the statute's provisions makes it clear that Congress 
intended this result. In Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 
F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit examined the interplay of the 
Immigration Act's various sections and stated that"it seems 
difficult not to conclude that the statutory scheme 
implicitly authorizes prolonged detention." Id. at 1446 
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(discussing 8 U.S.C. SS 1182(d)(5)(A), 1227(a)(1) (1994)). 
Nearly every Court of Appeals to reach the issue has agreed.2 
 
Even though the Immigration Act has never been a model 
of clarity, we agree with the courts that have construed its 
language and structure to permit the prolonged detention of 
excludable aggravated felons. To categorically "requir[e] that 
excludable aliens be released into American society when 
neither their countries of origin nor any third country will 
admit them," id. at 1448, will "ultimately result in our 
losing control over our borders." Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 
957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd , 472 U.S. 846 
(1985); see also Guzman, 130 F.3d at 66 ("Congress 
intended to grant the Attorney General the authority to 
detain excludable aliens indefinitely . . . ."); Barrera- 
Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1448 (in an area with"sensitive 
foreign policy implications," the Attorney General has the 
authority to detain excluded aliens). 
 
In 1996, after petitioner had been placed in detention, 
Congress made sweeping changes to the Immigration Act. 
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"); Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 ("IIRIRA").3 
Under the IIRIRA, what was once implicit is now express -- 
the Immigration Act now specifically provides that the 
Attorney General shall detain an "inadmissible" alien for a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) ("authorization 
is implicit in the statutory language"); Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney General, 
988 F.2d 1437, 1446, amended, 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993) (section 
1226(e) "appears to assume" the power to detain); Fernandez-Roque v. 
Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1984) (appearing to assume there 
was authority to detain); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103-04 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (Congress "implicitly authorized" indefinite detention). Cf. 
Alvarez-Mendez, 941 F.2d at 962 (concluding that the statute explicitly 
authorizes continued detention). But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. 
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (statute is vague). 
 
3. Immigration law is sufficiently labyrinthian without jumbled cross- 
references to the sections of the Immigration Act, IIRIRA, AEDPA, and 
the United States Code. When referring to statutory provisions, we 
therefore cite only to the United States Code wherever possible. 
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90-day period pending "removal" from the country,4 and 
may continue to detain him until deportation if he has been 
found guilty of designated crimes. 8 U.S.C. S 1231(a) (Supp. 
II 1996). 
 
Many provisions of the amended statute, however, do not 
apply to an alien "who is in exclusion . . . proceedings 
before [this subtitle's] effective date" of April 1, 1997. 8 
U.S.C. S 1101 note (reprinting IIRIRAS 309(c)(1)). It is 
arguable that since a final order of exclusion had been 
entered against petitioner before the effective date, he was 
no longer "in exclusion proceedings," and therefore, that 
the amended Act does not govern his situation. See 
Zadvydas v. Underdown, ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-31345, 1999 
WL 604311, at *4 & n.7 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 1999) (noting the 
confusion in the statute, and concluding that the IIRIRA 
applies to aliens who have received a final exclusion order). 
Because both the former and present statutes grant the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Among the changes brought by the IIRIRA was a shift in basic 
immigration terminology. Previously, "excludable" aliens were those who 
were ineligible for admission or entry into the United States, even though 
in reality they were often granted "parole," which allowed them to come 
into the country. 8 U.S.C. S 1182 (1994); Alvarez-Mendez, 941 F.2d at 
961 n.4. Excludable aliens could have their "parole" revoked, with 
exclusion proceedings brought to deport them. 8 U.S.C. SS 1182(d)(5)(A), 
1226-1227 (1994). "Deportation" proceedings, in contrast, were brought 
against those aliens who had gained admission into the country. Id. 
S 1252 (1994); Alvarez-Mendez, 941 F.2d at 961 n.4. See generally 5 
Gordon et al., supra, S 65.02[1]. 
 
As amended, the Immigration Act refers to "inadmissible" aliens in the 
place of "excludable" aliens. Although there are still separate grounds of 
"inadmissibility" and "deportability," the distinction now turns on 
whether an alien has been "admitted" to the United States, rather than 
on whether the alien has gained "entry." 5 Gordon et al., supra, 
S 63.01[3], at 63-7 & n.17 (citing 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(13)); id. S 
65.02[2], 
at 65-7 to 65-11. Also, the former distinction between "exclusion" and 
"deportation" proceedings has been dropped in favor of one procedure, 
called "removal" proceedings. 8 U.S.C. S 1229a (Supp. II 1996). Although 
certain inadmissible aliens are subject to an expedited removal 
procedure, id. SS 1225(b), 1228, the amended Act now uses "removal" 
proceedings as the general procedure for both inadmissible and 
deportable aliens. Id. S 1229a(a)(2), (3). 
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Attorney General authority to detain, we need not and do 
not decide which version currently applies. 
 
Similarly, both versions provide that the Attorney General 
may release a criminal alien from detention on parole 
subject to regulations. 8 U.S.C. S 1231(a)(3), (6) (Supp. II 
1996); 8 U.S.C. S 1226(e)(2), (3) (1994). Finally -- as will 
later appear -- the INS' parole review rules apply in either 
case.5 
 
II. 
 
Serious conflicts between policy and constitutional 
concerns are presented by criminal aliens whose countries 
of origin refuse to repatriate them. Congress' measures to 
insulate the community from potentially dangerous 
criminal aliens via lengthy detention have the potential to 
violate due process. Yet alternatives to incarceration have 
problems as well -- one Justice Department report 
concluded that 90 percent of aliens released from custody 
abscond. See Department of Justice, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Executive Office for Immigration 
Review, Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; 
Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal 
Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 
10,323 (1997). 
 
The influx into this country of Cuban criminals from Port 
Mariel in 1980 presents a concrete example of this conflict. 
Many of them were hardened convicts who had been 
released from their Cuban jails and included in the boat- 
lift. The Cuban government has refused to permit their 
return. Consequently, many of the Mariel Cubans-- 
approximately 1,750 -- still remain in INS detention 
because of their danger to the community. In addition to 
this group, the governments of Vietnam, Laos and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The adoption of the AEDPA and IIRIRA by Congress in 1996, together 
with the IIRIRA Transitional Rules that expired in October 1998, have 
created a complex assortment of amended and repealed provisions that 
is frequently baffling. In such a setting, rambling discussions on the 
possible application of the various versions of the statutes without a 
necessity to do so can create troubling precedents or dicta. 
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Cambodia have refused to repatriate citizens who have been 
ordered to be deported from the United States. The number 
of such aliens, including a number of Cubans who were not 
part of the Mariel boat-lift, exceeds 1,800. 
 
The power to exclude aliens is a "fundamental sovereign 
attribute exercised by the Government's political 
departments largely immune from judicial control." 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
210 (1953). "For reasons long recognized as valid, the 
responsibility for regulating the relationship between the 
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to 
the political branches of the Federal Government." Mathews 
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). It is a truism that "[i]n the 
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and 
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens." Id. at 79-80. An alien 
who is "on the threshold of initial entry" stands on a footing 
different from those who have "passed through our gates" 
-- " `Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it 
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.' " Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (quoting United States 
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)). 
 
The case before us does not question the validity of the 
procedures used to admit or exclude petitioner, but it is 
against that backdrop that we consider whether the 
indeterminable nature of his detention pending ultimate 
deportation rises to a constitutional violation. Even an 
excludable alien is a "person" for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment and is thus entitled to substantive due 
process. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 
(1896) ("persons within the territory of the United States 
. . . and . . . even aliens . . . [may not] . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law"); see 
also Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 
1987) (excludable alien may not be subjected to brutality by 
government officials). In addition, procedural due process is 
available to aliens in some circumstances. See Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) ("a continuously 
present resident alien is entitled to a fair hearing when 
threatened with deportation . . . [and] has a right to due 
process" before being required to leave the country). 
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In Mezei, the Attorney General detained an excludable 
individual for more than 21 months at Ellis Island because 
he posed a security threat. Other nations had refused to 
take him into their country. The Supreme Court concluded 
that no constitutional violation had occurred. 345 U.S. at 
215-16. Mezei has been much criticized, 6 but has remained 
a governing precedent and has been applied, with some 
modifications, in most of the leading cases. 
 
In Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, a case involving a Mariel 
Cuban, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that "applicable Supreme Court precedent 
squarely precludes a conclusion that [excludable aliens] 
have a constitutional right to be free from detention, even 
for an extended time." 44 F.3d at 1449. However, the Court 
qualified its holding, recognizing that the case did not 
involve "the constitutionality of `indefinite' or `permanent' 
detention with no prospect of release." Id . at 1450. Barrera- 
Echavarria also pointed to the existence of detailed 
regulations providing for periodic review of the alien's 
eligibility for parole. Id. (discussing 8 C.F.R. SS 212.12, 
212.13). Thus, the custody was not indefinite, but was 
instead "a series of one-year periods of detention followed 
by an opportunity to plead [the] case anew." Id. In those 
circumstances, the Court concluded that there was no 
constitutional violation. Id. 
 
Most appellate courts have reached a similar result, with 
some variation in their reasoning. In Palma v. Verdeyen, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to hold that 
the detention of a Mariel Cuban violated due process, 
saying that "the fifth and sixth amendments do not require 
a restrictive interpretation of the Immigration Act that 
would either circumscribe the right of the United States to 
deny admission to aliens or limit the congressional power 
granted in Article I S 8 . . . ." 676 F.2d at 104; see also 
Guzman, 130 F.3d at 66 (excluded alien's rights determined 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See, e.g., Jean, 472 U.S. at 876 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(listing 
commentaries); Lisa C. Solbakken, Note, The Anti-Terrorism And Effective 
Death Penalty Act: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-
Terrorism 
Pretext, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 1381, 1400 n.100 (1997) (listing 
commentaries). 
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by procedures established by Congress and not by the due 
process protections of the Fifth Amendment, and noting 
existence of regulations allowing parole); Gisbert, 988 F.2d 
at 1442-44 ("continued INS detention of the petitioners is 
not punishment and does not constitute a violation of the 
aliens' rights to substantive due process," and noting the 
existence of regulations for a grant of parole); Fernandez- 
Roque, 734 F.2d at 582. 
 
The one appellate opinion fundamentally differing in its 
approach is Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson. There, the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed that the 
prolonged detention at issue was "imprisonment under 
conditions as severe as we apply to our worst criminals." 
654 F.2d at 1385. Acknowledging the "entry fiction" that 
detention is only a continuation of exclusion, the Court 
construed the statute to require release so as to avoid the 
"serious constitutional questions" of indefinite detention. Id. 
at 1386. 
 
It is significant, however, that the decision in Rodriguez- 
Fernandez was handed down before the promulgation of 
regulations providing parole review for Mariel Cubans. A 
number of Courts have looked to the existence of those 
procedures to turn back due process challenges. See 
Guzman, 130 F.3d at 66; Barrera-Echavarria , 44 F.3d at 
1450; Palma, 676 F.2d at 104-05. Cf. Alvarez-Mendez, 941 
F.2d at 962-63 (not relying on existence of procedures in 
constitutional analysis); Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1442-44 
(holding that denial of parole is not a constitutional 
violation, but noting that petitioners did not assert the 
government failed to follow the review procedures); 
Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 582 (because petitioners had 
no liberty interest whatsoever, there was no need to look to 
Cuban review procedures). 
 
A post-IIRIRA case also cited the parole provisions. In 
Zadvydas v. Underdown, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit discussed the plight of a "stateless person" with a 
long criminal history who had been ordered deported. In 
that case, the petitioner was a resident alien rather than an 
excludable alien, as was the situation with the Mariel 
Cubans. The Court, looking to the IIRIRA, decided that 
once an order of deportation is final, no distinction exists 
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between the rights of resident aliens and those ordered 
removed as excludable. 1999 WL 604311, at *5, *11-*12. In 
that fashion, the Court confined the distinction created by 
the Mezei "entry fiction" to proceedings prior to a final order 
of exclusion or deportation. Id. at *12-*13. 
 
The Zadvydas Court noted two justifications for detention 
-- the risk of flight and the threat of additional criminal 
activity. "[W]hile we must tolerate a certain risk of 
recidivism from our criminal citizens, we need not be 
similarly generous when it comes to those who have not 
achieved citizenship." Id. at *13. The Court held that 
detention was permissible "while good faith efforts to 
effectuate the alien's deportation continue and reasonable 
parole and periodic review procedures are in place." Id. at 
*14. Reasoning that the alien might ultimately find a 
country that would accept him, the Court concluded that 
the detention was permissible because rules permitting 
parole review were in existence. Id. at *4, *7, *14 (citing 
Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1443 n.11). 
 
To summarize, case law holds there is no constitutional 
impediment to the indefinite detention of an alien with a 
criminal record under a final order of exclusion, 
deportation, or removal if (1) there is a possibility of his 
eventual departure; (2) there are adequate and reasonable 
provisions for the grant of parole; and (3) detention is 
necessary to prevent a risk of flight or a threat to the 
community. 
 
To a large extent, these holdings are based on thefiction 
that "detention is not punishment," and the"entry" fiction 
that an excludable alien "stands at the border" even when 
he has been physically present within the country for years. 
Characterizing prolonged detention as anything other than 
punishment might be somewhat puzzling to petitioner, who 
remained in jail under the same conditions as before the 
state released him, although his status had technically 
changed from that of a state inmate to an INS "detainee." 
Similarly, an alien whose detention occurs in a maximum 
security federal prison may be forgiven for wondering when 
his punishment stopped and detention began. Rodriguez- 
Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1385. 
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As Justice Jackson remarked, "[i]t overworks legal fiction 
to say that one is free in law when by the commonest of 
common sense he is bound." Mezei, 345 U.S. at 220 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). It is similarly unrealistic to believe 
that these INS detainees are not actually being"punished" 
in some sense for their past conduct. 
 
Nevertheless, the power of the government to detain 
aliens is well-established. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
305-06 (1993). Even citizens may be confined pretrial 
under certain circumstances. United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987). Indeed, a citizen may be 
committed indefinitely when his mental condition poses a 
danger of criminal violence to the community. Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997); Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979). 
 
We therefore hold that aliens with criminal records as 
specified in the Immigration Act may be detained for 
lengthy periods when removal is beyond the control of the 
INS, provided that appropriate provisions for parole are 
available. When detention is prolonged, special care must 
be exercised so that the confinement does not continue 
beyond the time when the original justifications for custody 
are no longer tenable. The fact that some aliens posed a 
risk of flight in the past does not mean they will forever fall 
into that category. Similarly, presenting danger to the 
community at one point by committing crime does not place 
them forever beyond redemption. 
 
Measures must be taken to assess the risk of flight and 
danger to the community on a current basis. The stakes are 
high and we emphasize that grudging and perfunctory 
review is not enough to satisfy the due process right to 
liberty, even for aliens. 
 
For example, the petitioner in this case was repeatedly 
denied parole by INS officials based on no more than a 
reading of his file that listed years-old convictions for 
firearm, attempted robbery, and bail jumping offenses. No 
inquiry was made to ascertain, for example, whether the 
bail jumping offense was the result of a lack of notice, 
misunderstanding, or an affirmative effort to avoid 
apprehension. The INS made no effort to determine if such 
 
                                13 
  
conduct was presently likely to be repeated or whether it 
could be discouraged by requiring appropriate surety. 
Through at least four denials of parole, the INS continued 
to cite to the petitioner's now nearly ten-year old 
convictions as justification to confine him. 
 
We do not suggest that these convictions are no longer 
relevant. Due process is not satisfied, however, by rubber- 
stamp denials based on temporally distant offenses. The 
process due even to deportable and excludable aliens 
requires an opportunity for an evaluation of the individual's 
current threat to the community and his risk offlight. 
 
It is extremely unlikely that the petitioner's detention will 
be permanent. Diplomatic efforts with Vietnam are 
underway, albeit at a speed approximating the flow of cold 
molasses. Although the progress is agonizingly slow, it 
nonetheless represents movement toward the petitioner's 
ultimate repatriation. He has, however, been detained in a 
prison setting for more than four years after being found by 
state authorities to be suitable for release into the 
community following his criminal convictions. To presume 
dangerousness to the community and risk of flight based 
solely on his past record does not satisfy due process. 
 
After oral argument on this case, the INS announced 
detailed Interim Rules for detainees such as petitioner, and 
its intention to promulgate regulations to the same effect.7 
These rules have some similarities to those available for the 
Mariel Cubans. The Interim Rules include (1) written notice 
to the alien thirty days prior to the custody review advising 
that he may present information supporting a release; (2) 
the right to representation by counsel or other individuals; 
(3) the opportunity for an annual personal interview; (4) 
written explanations for a custody decision; (5) the 
opportunity for review by INS headquarters; (6) reviews 
every six months; (7) a refusal to presume continued 
detention based on criminal history; and other provisions, 
as quoted in the Appendix attached to this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate 
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, Interim Changes and 
Instructions for Conduct of Post-Order Custody Reviews (Aug. 6, 1999). 
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We have reviewed these rules carefully and conclude that 
conscientiously applied, they provide reasonable assurance 
of fair consideration of a petitioner's application for parole 
pending removal. We are aware that in a similar case, a 
five-judge District Court in the Western District of 
Washington required that detainees receive a hearing before 
an immigration judge with a right of appeal to the Bureau 
of Immigration Appeals. Phan v. Reno, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 
Nos. C98-234Z, C99-177C, C99-185R, C99-341WD, C99- 
151L, 1999 WL 521980, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 1999). 
That Court noted its dissatisfaction with earlier INS review 
procedures, reciting criticism that "Directors simply relied 
on the aliens' past criminal history and the fact that they 
were facing removal from the United States, summarily 
concluding that the aliens posed such risks and denying 
them release." Id. We agree that such superficial review is 
not satisfactory and does not afford due process. 
 
The Interim Rules, subsequently announced by the INS, 
appear on their face to satisfy Phan's objections. Among 
other things, the rules require an individualized analysis of 
the alien's eligibility for parole, present danger to society 
and willingness to comply with the removal order. 
Moreover, they do not result in placing additional cases on 
the already overloaded dockets of immigration judges. 
 
The Interim Rules apply to petitioner, regardless of 
whether one concludes that he is being detained under the 
former or present versions of the Immigration Act. Our 
reading of the Interim Rules suggests that they will 
encourage good faith review. So long as petitioner will 
receive searching periodic reviews, the prospect of indefinite 
detention without hope for parole will be eliminated. In 
these circumstances, due process will be satisfied. 
 
We do not intend to create a new legal fiction that allows 
for de facto indefinite detention based upon reviews that 
are comprehensive in theory but perfunctory in fact. Thus, 
if experience should show that our initial reaction to the 
Interim Rules or eventual permanent regulations was too 
sanguine, there will be time enough to consider the more 
extensive methods suggested by the Phan Court. 
 
The petitioner has not yet received the rigorous review of 
his eligibility for parole that due process requires. 
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Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be reversed 
and the case remanded with directions that the petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus be granted and the petitioner 
released unless within 30 days the INS begins the review 
process for petitioner under the Interim Rules set out in the 
Appendix to this opinion (or under permanent regulations 
that are at least as favorable to him). We neither express 
nor intimate any views as to whether petitioner should be 
released on parole as a result of review under the Interim 
Rules. 
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APPENDIX 
 
INTERIM PROCEDURES 
 
(1)    Pursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. S 241.4, the 
       District Director will continue to conduct a custody 
       review of administratively final order removal cases 
       before the ninety-day removal period mandated by 
       S 241(a)(1) expires for aliens whose departure cannot 
       be effected within the removal period. 
 
(2)    These procedures apply to any alien ordered removed 
       who is inadmissible under S 212, removable under 
       237(a)(1)(C), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(4) or who has been 
       determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the 
       community or unlikely to comply with the order of 
       removal. They cover aliens convicted of an aggravated 
       felony offense who are subject to the provisions of old 
       INA S 236(e)(1)-(3), and non-aggravated felon aliens 
       with final orders of exclusion. Mariel Cubans are 
       excluded from these procedures as parole reviews for 
       them are governed by 8 C.F.R. S 212.12. The ninety- 
       day review will be conducted pursuant to the 
       instructions set out in the memoranda of February 3 
       and April 30, 1999. District Directors may, in their 
       discretion, interview the alien if they believe that an 
       interview would facilitate the custody review. 
 
(3)    Following expiration of the ninety-day removal period, 
       the next scheduled review provided by the District 
       Director shall be nine months from the date of thefinal 
       administrative order of removal or six months after the 
       last review, whichever is later. Written notice shall be 
       given to each alien at least 30 days prior to the date of 
       the review. The notice will be provided either by 
       personal service or certified mail/return receipt. The 
       notice shall specify the factors to be considered and 
       explain that the alien will be provided the opportunity 
       to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
       he is not a threat to the community and is likely to 
       comply with the removal order. 
 
(4)    For the review discussed in paragraph 3 above, an 
       interview is mandatory and the District Director's 
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       preliminary decision will be subject to Headquarters 
       review. Thereafter, custody reviews will be conducted 
       every six months, alternating between District Director 
       file reviews and a review that includes the opportunity 
       for an interview at the alien's request and a 
       Headquarters review of detention decisions. A separate 
       notice will advise the alien of the opportunity for the 
       interview. The alien may check the appropriate box on 
       the notice, returning the form provided within 14 
       calendar days so that an interview may be scheduled. 
       The District Director has the discretion to schedule 
       further interviews if he determines they would assist 
       him in reaching a custody determination. 
 
(5)    The alien must be advised that he may submit any 
       information relevant to support his request for release 
       from detention, either in writing, electronically, by U.S. 
       mail (or any combination thereof), or in person if an 
       interview is conducted. The alien must also be advised 
       that he may be represented by an attorney, or other 
       person at no expense to the government. If an 
       interview has been scheduled, the alien's 
       representative may attend the review at the scheduled 
       time. 
 
(6)    The District Director may delegate custody decisions to 
       the level of the Assistant District Director, Deputy 
       Assistant District Director, or those acting in their 
       capacity. Custody determinations will be made by 
       weighing favorable and adverse factors to determine 
       whether the detainee has demonstrated by clear and 
       convincing evidence that he does not pose a threat to 
       the community, and is likely to comply with the 
       removal order. See 8 C.F.R. S 241.4. The alien's past 
       failure to cooperate in obtaining a travel document 
       shall be considered an adverse factor in determining 
       eligibility for release. See INA S 241(a)(1)(C) Suspension 
       of Period. The fact that the alien has a criminal history 
       does not create a presumption in favor of continued 
       detention. 
 
(7)    Within thirty days of the District Director's custody 
       review, the alien must receive written notification of a 
       custody decision. All notification will be provided either 
 
                                18 
  
       by personal service or certified mail/return receipt. A 
       decision to release should specify the conditions of 
       release. A decision to detain will clearly delineate the 
       factors presented by the alien in support of his release, 
       and the reasons for the District Director's decision. 
 
(8)    With respect to those detain decisions that are subject 
       to Headquarters review under paragraph 4, the District 
       Director's determination that the alien should be 
       detained is to be regarded as only preliminary. In those 
       instances, the Regional Directors will forward the 
       preliminary detain decisions to Headquarters for 
       review. Headquarters review will be conducted by 
       Operations and Programs representatives (with 
       assistance from the Office of General Counsel as 
       necessary). Where the Headquarters reviewer's decision 
       concurs with the District Director's, the Headquarters 
       reviewer will write a supporting statement and will seek 
       concurrence from a second Headquarters reviewer. 
       Where the two reviewers differ, a panel of three 
       Headquarters reviewers will conduct a further review of 
       the case. The Headquarters panel may ratify the 
       District Director's decision, return the case to the 
       District Director to reconsider his decision, or 
       determine that additional information is required to 
       make a decision. The Headquarters review must be 
       completed within thirty days of file receipt. The 
       Headquarters review conclusions will be forwarded to 
       the Regional Director for distribution to and 
       appropriate action by the District Director. 
 
(9)    The District Director will review his decision in light of 
       the Headquarters recommendations and will notify the 
       alien of the final custody determination within thirty 
       days of completion of the Headquarters review. 
 
(10)   The District Director should make every effort to effect 
       the alien's removal both before and after expiration of 
       the removal period. All steps to secure travel 
       documents must be fully documented in the alien's 
       file. However, if the District Director is unable to 
       secure travel documents locally after making diligent 
       efforts to do so, then the case shall be referred to 
       Headquarters OPS/DDP for assistance. More detailed 
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       instructions will be issued from the Executive 
       Associate Commissioner for Operations by separate 
       memorandum. 
 
(11)   On August 30, 1999, and on the last workday of each 
       quarter (September, December, March, June) each 
       district shall submit a custody review status report to 
       its Regional office and to Headquarters. There will be 
       more detailed instructions issued on reporting 
       procedures at a later time. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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